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The Gender Wage Gaps, ‘Sticky Floors’ and 
‘Glass Ceilings’ of the European Union 
 
We consider and attempt to understand the gender wage gap across 24 EU member states, 
all of which share the objective of gender equality, using 2007 data from the European Union 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions.
* The size of the gender wage gap varies 
considerably across countries and selection corrections affect the offered gap, sometimes 
substantially. Most of the gap cannot be explained by the characteristics available in this data 
set. Quantile regressions show that, in most countries, the wage gap is wider at the top of the 
wage distribution (‘glass ceilings’) and, in fewer countries, it is wider at the bottom of the 
wage distribution (‘sticky floors’). These features are related to country-specific 
characteristics that cannot be evaluated at the member state level. We use the cross-country 
variation in this large sample of member states to explore the influence of (i) policies 
concerned with reconciling work and family life and (ii) wage-setting institutions. We find that 





We study the wage gaps prevailing in the EU, having taken account of the productivity 
characteristics of the two genders and selection into working status. We find substantial 
unexplained gaps which are, however, related to the family reconciliation policies and wage 
setting institutions prevailing in the various member states. The wage gap is generally wider 
at the top and sometimes also wider at the bottom of the wage distribution. Policies to deal 
with the gender gap must be designed with care as they sometimes have unintended effects: 
For instance, more generous maternity leave policies are associated with higher wage gaps. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The reduction of labour market gender disparities has attracted considerable political 
and legislative attention in the European Union. Two different directives, the Racial 
Equality Directive and the Employment Framework Directive, define a set of 
principles that offer legal protection against discrimination. The EU Employment 
Guidelines, 2003/58/EC of July 22, 2003, indicate that “Member States will, through 
an integrated approach combining gender mainstreaming and specific policy actions, 
encourage female labour market participation and achieve a substantial reduction in 
gender gaps in employment rates, unemployment rates and pay by 2010”. In this 
paper we examine the gender pay gap across the EU countries, all of which share the 
principles referred to above. 
 
While a number of important studies have addressed some of these issues for some 
EU countries (see, inter alia, Arulampalam et al (2006), Olivetti and Petrongolo 
(2008), and Nicodemo (2009)), this paper focuses on the unexplained gaps, ‘sticky 
floors’ and ‘glass ceilings’ that can be discerned in all member states (MSs) and 
attempts to relate them to country-specific wage-setting institutions and to policies 
that reconcile work and family life. In order to do this effectively, it is necessary to 
use the maximum number of MSs available so as to achieve the maximum variability 
in institutional and policy settings. The 2007 EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset includes information on 24 of the 2007 MSs (all except 
Malta). This information is available on a consistent basis across MSs, thereby 
making it possible to implement a common protocol to measure the various gaps. We 
explore the degree of success of the conditioning set of common variables available in 
explaining the MS wage gaps, using the benchmark Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) 
decomposition, with and without Heckman (1974, 1979) corrections. The 
methodology of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) is also used to explore the impact of 
differential employment rates on the observed wage distributions and some 
noteworthy differences between the corrected wage gaps and those that emerge 
through the Heckman (1974, 1979) corrections are discerned. The variation in the 
gender-wage gap across the wage distribution is examined using quantile regression 
analysis, following the methodology proposed by Melly (2005). This allows us to   3
search for possible ‘sticky floor’ and ‘glass ceiling’ effects - see Albrecht et al (2003). 
With these gaps and effects established on a consistent basis across the 24 MSs, we 
consider the extent to which they are related to various country features. The OECD 
(2001) work-family reconciliation index, initially covering 14 EU and OECD 
countries, is recreated for the 24 EU countries in our sample and is used, along with 
the unionisation rate, to examine the relationship between gaps and effects on the one 
hand and country features on the other. 
 
We find that the gender wage gap is positive and significant in all 24 EU MSs. 
Consistent with Nicodemo (2009), Arulampalam et al (2006), and other studies, the 
bulk of the observed wage differences cannot be explained by observed 
characteristics. When the Heckman (1974, 1979) corrections are carried out, wage 
gaps are still positive and significant in almost all countries. When the different 
imputation methodologies proposed by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) are used to 
correct for the possible sample selection created by divergent patterns of non-
employment across countries, the median wage gap increases substantially for almost 
all countries. The quantile-based wage decompositions reveal the presence of ‘glass 
ceiling’ effects in the majority of countries and ‘sticky floor’ effects in a significant 
number of countries. Looking across the 24 MSs, the general unexplained part of the 
wage gap, as well as the glass ceiling and sticky floor effects appear to be 
systematically related to features of MS work-family reconciliation policies and their 
wage-setting institutions.  
 
The objective in this literature has largely been to ensure that gender-specific features 
of wage distributions, especially among countries that share and promote the objective 
of gender equality, cannot be attributed to unobservable characteristics and that 
unexplained effects relate truly to female disadvantage. In single-country 
explorations, country-specific policies must remain an unobservable, captured only by 
intercept differences among gender-specific wage equations. Some hope of narrowing 
down the unexplained effects exists when several country experiences can be 
compared. This likelihood is clearly enhanced when the number of countries studied 
is increased. Yet, international explorations run the risk of muddling possible gender 
disadvantage with data consistency problems and country differences in institutions   4
and policies. By focusing on a set of countries with similar values
1 and the same data, 
we hope to contribute to this important area.  
  
Section 2 notes briefly the literature that also follows a broad sweep across countries 
and provides background information on the gender wage gap in the EU. Section 3 
describes the EU-SILC data and section 4 the econometric methodology used and the 
results obtained. Section 5 considers the work-family reconciliation index and 
unionisation rates and their relation to the wage gap. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The gender wage gap in the EU: A brief survey of the literature 
 
The literature on the gender gap is, of course, enormous. A number of papers adopt a 
cross-country perspective. Plantenga and Remery (2006) examine, for the European 
Commission, the unconditional gender wage gap for 24 EU states (except Malta) plus 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway and survey policies that aim to reduce this gap. 
Rubery (2002), examines these policies and targets, concludes that concrete objectives 
and time frames are needed. Brainerd (2000) examines the gender wage gap in ex 
USSR MSs, while Newell and Reilly (2001) note that the gap in east European 
countries has not exhibited an upward trend during the transition. Weichselbaumer 
and Winter-Ebmer (2005), based on a meta-analysis of international gender wage 
gaps, conclude that between the 1960s and the 1990s unconditional differentials fell. 
They attributed this to the improved education and training for women. Blau and 
Kahn (1996), using the Juhn et al (1991) decomposition, show that eight European 
countries have a lower gender gap than the US and attribute this to higher female 
wages in Europe for low earners. Blau and Kahn (2003) argue that institutional 
settings affect the gender wage gap. 
 
Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) examine the non-randomness of selection into work 
and how this might affect international comparisons of gender wage gaps. They 
estimate median wage gaps in a sample of employed workers and also in a sample 
enlarged with the non-employed - for whom wages were imputed. They find that, for 
                                                 
1 It is conceivable that gender policies and attitudes may not be homogeneous across all MSs. For 
instance, the countries joining on May 1, 2004 may have not adjusted fully. Also, countries in the 
former USSR may have a different set of values and practices. We comment on these issues below.   5
most countries, the median wage gaps in imputed wage distributions are higher than 
those in the actual wage distributions, suggesting that in those countries female high 
earners are overrepresented in the workforce. They find a negative correlation 
between the gender wage gap and gender employment gap, thus resolving the paradox 
that countries, such as Greece, have a lower wage gap than Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
Nicodemo (2009) examines the extent of the wage gap in a sample of five 
Mediterranean EU countries (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in 2001 and 
2006, using the EU-SILC and the European Community Household Panel Survey 
(ECHPS) datasets. She finds a positive wage gap in all countries, in both time periods, 
the greater part of which cannot be explained by observed characteristics. The gender 
gap is larger at the bottom of the distribution and smaller at the top of the distribution 
in most countries in 2006. 
 
Arulampalam et al (2006) examine the gender wage gap in 11 European countries 
using the ECHPS for the years 1995-2001. The gap widens toward the top of the wage 
distribution in most of countries and, in a few cases, it also widens at the bottom of 
the distribution. The authors use the OECD (2001) work-family reconciliation index 
to examine the possible factors that affect the extent of the wage gap. They conclude 
that differences in family and work reconciliation policies and wage setting 
institutions (proxied by union membership rates) across EU countries may account for 
the variation in the wage gap. Child care provision is an important factor that affects 
the decision of  women to enter the labour market. Viitanen (2005), examining UK 
data, finds that the price of childcare has a significant, negative, effect on the 
probability of working as well as on using formal childcare. Del Boca and Vuri 
(2007), using data for Italy, find that policies that reduce the cost of child care and 
expand the child care system can have a positive impact on female employment. 
Gustafsson and Stafford (1992) find that the high quality of public child care in 
Sweden encourages women with small children to enter paid employment. 
 
Despite the wealth of information and methodologies contained in these studies, a gap 
remains. No study has investigated the conditional gap across a large number of 
countries, that share similar declared policies, and examined the extent to which the 
unexplained gender gap may be related to country-specific policies and institutions.   6
3 Data  
 
The data used for the econometric analysis, available since 2004, is the 2007 EU-
SILC prepared by the statistical services of MSs on behalf of Eurostat. EU-SILC 
collects comparable cross sectional data on income, poverty, and social exclusion. 
Information is available for all EU countries except Malta; Norway and Iceland are 
also included but these countries are excluded from our EU sample. 
 
The EU-SILC data set reports a wealth of information on the personal characteristics 
of each individual. These include age, education, marital status, number of children, 
and child care details. Also, it reports information on working status, whether an 
individual was working full time or part time, the industry of employment and his or 
her occupation and years of working experience (not available for all countries). In 
addition, information on annual earnings (the variable analysed here) is available - we 
use the terms earnings and wages interchangeably. In order to keep the length of this 
paper reasonable, we have placed further explanatory and technical material in a 
number of Appendices which are not part of the paper; these are available on request.  
 
Beginning with the original-data base sample, in the working sample we include 
individuals who (i) are aged between 25 and 54, (ii) work as employees (employers 
and the self-employed are excluded), (iii) work full time (students and the 
handicapped are excluded) for the whole of the previous year, worked at least one 
hour during the week prior to the interview and do not have a second job, and (iv) 
received an annual wage larger than €1000. These restrictions bypass complications 
involving further education, preparation for retirement, part-time status and the 
truthful reporting of incomes and they produce a more homogeneous sample. In our 
main results, age is used as a proxy for experience. However, some direct-experience 
information is also available for all countries except Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Sweden, and the UK. Experience is reported for all individuals in Cyprus, 
the Czech Republic and Italy. For other countries apart from Slovenia, the number of 
observations lost is very small. It varies from 0.08% (1 individual) for the female 
Estonian sample, to 2.24% (24 individuals) for the Irish male sample. In Slovenia, if 
we exclude individuals who do not report their experience, the male sample decreases 
by 63.32% and the female sample by 63.5%. Section 4.1 provides further details.   7
 
Table 1 presents the average unconditional ln-annual earnings and the  employment 
rate
2, by gender, for each country. The wage gap is defined as the difference between 
the male and female average ln-wage earnings. The highest male and female earnings 
are received in Denmark and Luxembourg, while the lowest are received in Latvia 
and the Slovak Republic. The highest differences between male and female earnings 
are observed in Cyprus and Estonia, with 0.502 and 0.423 ln-earning units, 
respectively, while the lowest differences are observed in Slovenia and Hungary, with 
0.087 and 0.100 ln-earning units respectively. The highest male employment rates are 
observed in Denmark and Cyprus (95% and 94%, respectively) and the lowest male 
employment rates in Finland and Poland (81% and 80% respectively). The highest 
female employment rates are observed in the Slovak Republic and Estonia (83% and 
80%, respectively) while the lowest employment rates are observed in The 
Netherlands and Greece (30% and 41%, respectively). Figure 1 presents the wage gap 
by country. The countries with the highest gender wage gap are new MSs (Cyprus, 
Estonia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic). The lowest 
gender wage gap is observed in Slovenia and Hungary. Thus, of the nine new MSs in 
the sample, six have the highest and two the lowest unconditional gender wage gaps, 
with Poland being closer to the middle of the pack. The Scandinavian countries in the 
sample (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) have middling gender gaps, while Greece, 
Italy and Spain have relatively low gaps - a fact that motivated the Olivetti and 
Petrongolo (2008) study. The average gender wage gap across the EU24 is 0.381 ln-
wage points and the average employment gap is 27%. 
 
The unconditional correlation between the gender earnings and employment gap is 
negative though it is quite weak and not statistically significant.
3 Olivetti and 
Petrongolo (2008), using a different set of countries and data, also found a negative 
correlation coefficient between the two measures.
4 They attach importance to this 
                                                 
2 The ‘employment’ rate is calculated as the number of individuals included in the working sample 
over the number of individuals in the base sample. 
3 The correlation is -0.23. The estimated coefficient from the regression of the gender wage gap on the 
gender employment gap is -0.015 and the associated p-value for the hypothesis that the regression 
coefficient is equal to zero is 0.15. 
4 The database used was the ECHPS and the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The 
countries included were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. The correlation coefficient in 
the Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) dataset was -0.474.   8
correlation because they believe that the low gender wage gap in countries such as 
Greece and Italy is indicative of positive selection into the working sample, 
suggesting that the observed wage gap in these countries is not representative. 
4 Econometric model  
 
All analysis is conducted separately for each gender. We begin by estimating 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) ln-earnings equations which take account of all 
relevant characteristics available in the EU-SILC data. When the Heckman (1974, 
1979) corrections are implemented in the context of the Probit model, we use 
additional variables which account for membership in the selected sample. Given this 
information and following Oaxaca-Ransom (1994), we proceed to decompose the 
mean difference between the male and female earnings into a portion attributable to 
characteristics and portions attributable to the ‘male advantage’ and the ‘female 
disadvantage’. In a second set of decompositions and following Melly (2005), we 
consider decompositions along the entire wage distribution, not just at the mean, 
allowing us to establish possible ‘sticky floors’ and ‘glass ceilings’. Following 
Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), we impute wages for the observations in the base 
sample that were not included in the working sample and consider the median wage 
gap and its relation to employment rates.
5 In section 5, various gaps are examined 
under the prism of the work-family and wage setting institutions in the 24 MSs. 
4.1 The Oaxaca-Ransom decompositions 
 
The Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) decomposition is given by:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ M FM F N M M NF N F WW XX X X β ββ ββ −= − + −+ −                (1) 
 
where 
M W  and  
F W  are the average values of ln earnings for males and females, 
M X  and 
F X  are vectors with the average characteristics for the two genders and  ˆM β  
and   ˆF β  are the OLS estimates of relevant coefficients.  ˆN β   is a non-discriminatory 
coefficient structure obtained from the pooled regression of males and females.
6 The 
first term in equation (1) measures the explained part, the second the male advantage 
                                                 
5 Kunze (2008) summarises the major econometric methodologies used in the literature. 
6 Other ways of defining  ˆN β  were proposed by Reimers (1983) and Cotton (1988).   9
(i.e., the extent to which the male characteristics are valued above the non-
discriminatory coefficient structure) and the third the female disadvantage (i.e., the 
extent to which the female characteristics are valued below the non-discriminatory 
coefficient structure). Only the earnings of the individuals who are working are 
observed and, as a result, the sample may not be random. To deal with this selection 
problem, we use the Heckman (1974, 1979) model.  
 
Table 2 provides the decomposition results with age used as a proxy for experience. 
In Table 3, the actual value of experience is used instead of age in a sample where this 
information in available. In both tables, the set of explanatory variables in the wage 
equations includes education, firm size, marital status, industry of employment and 
occupation. The Probit equations include education, marital status, the number of 
children, income from property rents, financial assets and other allowances, mortgage 
expenses, child-care provisions and occupation; the additional variables, as well as the 
non-linearity of the Probit equation, aid in identification. 
 
By a property of OLS, the predicted total gap in column 1, Table 2, is equal the actual 
gap appearing in Figure 1, so that Cyprus has the highest average predicted gender 
pay gap and Slovenia the lowest. Column 5, Table 2, reports the pay gap that is 
predicted to prevail once selection into the base sample is taken into account (the 
‘offered’ gap) and, in some cases (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the EU) the selection-adjusted 
gap is even higher, suggesting that positive selection is at work. The explained part of 
the decompositions is smaller than the unexplained part (male and female 
disadvantage combined) for almost all cases, regardless of whether selection 
corrections have been made. This suggests that the data available do not fully account 
for the behaviour of earnings and/or that a substantial amount of female disadvantage 
may exist. Interestingly, Scandinavian countries but also Cyprus (which has the 
highest gap) have the highest proportion of the gap explained by characteristics, while 
Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain have very low 
proportions of the wage gap explained. In some cases, the explained gap is negative, 
suggesting that female characteristics are superior to male ones. For the vast majority 
of countries, the female disadvantage is larger than the male advantage, likely because 
the non-discriminatory structure is weighted towards the numerically dominant males.   10
 
In Table 3 experience is used instead of age in the wage and Probit equations. 
Allowing for the fact that a number of countries do not have experience data, most of 
the statements made in the previous paragraph continue to hold and so we do not 
pursue the experience/age issue any further. 
 
When tables parallel to Tables 2 and 3 but without the industry and occupation effects 
in the wage and Probit equations (as appropriate), are constructed, the explained parts 
are significantly smaller, suggesting the importance of industry and occupation effects 
in explaining the gender wage gap - see Polachek (1981). 
4.2 Quantile decompositions of the gender wage gap 
 
The quantile regression methodology (see Koenker and Bassett (1978) allows the 
characteristics of individuals to have different impacts at different points of the wage 
distribution; it consequently affects the implied decompositions at each point. This 
approach allows examination of ‘glass ceiling’ and ‘sticky floor’ phenomena. In the 
case of the former, a larger unexplained gender wage gap is observed at the top of the 
wage distribution, suggesting that, as women advance to top positions, their pay may 
not increase pari pasu. In the case of the latter, a larger unexplained earnings gap at 
the lower end of the wage distribution may suggest that females enter occupations and 
industries with low pay and few advancement opportunities. Decomposition 
procedures based on quantile regression have been proposed by Melly (2005), 
Machado and Mata (2005) and Gosling et al (2000). We follow Melly (2005). 
 
One of the first studies to use quantile regression to study these phenomena is 
Albrecht et al (2003). The authors examine the gender wage gap in Sweden, using 
data for 1998, and find noteworthy glass ceiling effects. Arulampalam et al (2006) 
analyze the gender wage gap for eleven European Union countries
7 over the period 
1994-2001 and find glass ceiling effects for the majority of the countries in their 
sample and, in a few cases, signs of sticky floor phenomena. 
 
                                                 
7 The countries used in the analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Spain.   11
Melly (2005) decomposes the difference between male and female wages (the left 
hand side of equation (2)) into the three factors that appear on the right hand side of 
equation (2), namely the effect of differences in residuals, in (median) coefficients, 
and in covariates: 
 





ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ,, , ,
ˆˆ ˆˆ ,, ( 2 )
ˆˆ ˆˆ ,,
MM FF MM m M r FM
mM rF M F M
FM FF












M X and 
F X are vectors with male and female characteristics,  ˆM β  and 
ˆF β are the estimated median coefficients on characteristics,  ( ) ˆ ˆ ,
F M qX β  is the 
counterfactual earnings distribution of individuals with characteristics 
M X  and 
coefficients  ˆF β , and  ()
, ˆ ˆ ,
mM rF M qX β  is the distribution that would have prevailed if 
the median coefficients were the same for males and females but the residuals were 
distributed as in the female distribution. The set of personal characteristics included 
are the same as in section 4.1.
8 The decomposition results appear in Table 4 and our 
findings on sticky floor and glass ceiling effects are summarised in Table 5. Figure 2 
presents, by country, decompositions over the male and female earnings distribution.  
 
Table 4 reports the quantile regression decompositions obtained for five quantiles 
(10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90%). The part of the observed wage gap (not adjusted 
for selection) that is not explained by observed characteristics (the third term in 
equation (2)) is shown in square brackets. The last two columns of Table 4 repeat the 
total and the unexplained part (the sum of the male advantage and the female 
disadvantage) from Table 2 to facilitate the comparison between the quantile and 
Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) decomposition results. 
 
                                                 
8 Some of the industries and occupations were merged because participation in these was very low for 
some of the countries and the decompositions could not have been performed if these near-singleton 
dummy variables where included in the estimation. More specifically armed forces employees were 
joined with professionals for Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. Agriculture, fishing and mining employees were combined with craft 
workers for Belgium, Finland, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Poland. Agriculture and the 
construction sector were merged for France and The Netherlands.   12
When the total and the unexplained gaps at the 50
th percentile of the quantile 
regression decompositions are compared to the mean values in the Oaxaca and 
Ransom (1994) decompositions, the results in the quantile decompositions show that 
many more countries have unexplained components that exceed the total wage gaps. 
This suggests that, at the median of the wage distribution, females tend to have higher 
qualifications than men. Indeed, this is generally the case for lower quantiles.
9 By the 
75
th percentile, this is true for only 13 countries and by the 90
th percentile it is true for 
only 10 countries. Thus, the quantile results reinforce the conclusion in the Oaxaca-
Ransom decompositions that a substantial portion of the earnings gap remains 
unexplained and offer the additional insight that this is more true at the lower than at 
the higher end of the earnings distribution. As in the Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) 
results, the quantile decompositions continue to show the six new MSs with the 
highest unconditional gender gaps (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic) at the top of the unexplained gap list, while the 





We define a sticky floor and a glass ceiling as existing if the 10
th percentile and the 
90
th percentile respectively exceed other reference points of the wage distribution (see 
Table 5) by at least two percentage points. The results are summarized in Table 5. 
There is evidence of sticky floors in 10 out of the 24 countries in the sample using the 
10-25 difference and 11 countries when using the 10-50 difference. The strongest 
evidence for sticky floors is found in Cyprus, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Spain, 
where differences for all three reference points can be seen. This phenomenon for 
Cyprus and Luxembourg can be partly attributed to the high segregation of women in 
low-paying industries and occupations.
10  
 
A number of countries exhibit significant signs of glass ceiling effects. In Table 5, 14 
countries satisfy all three reference standards and a number of other countries meet 
one or two of the three criteria. Only 6 countries do not exhibit these effects based on 
any of the three measures used. These countries are Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, 
                                                 
9 In Hungary, Italy, Portugal, and Slovenia the unexplained part is larger than the total effect 
throughout the wage distribution. By contrast, in Estonia, the unexplained part is lower than the total 
difference throughout the wage distribution. 
10 In Appendix F, the industry and occupation segregation index is provided for all EU countries.   13
Lithuania, Portugal, and Spain and it is surprising that this list does not include the 
Scandinavian countries. The results for Greece and Spain are very interesting and 
conform with the motivation of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) who argue for an 
extreme form of positive selection in these countries, i.e. that only the most highly 
qualified and paid women enter the labour market. Table 5 also summarises the 
general shape of the total ln earnings distributions in the 24 countries studied. 
 
This feature of our results is examined more conveniently in Figure 2. The blue solid 
lines plot the actual wage distribution, the red dotted lines show the unexplained 
component and the blue dashed/dotted lines indicate the explained component. The 
unexplained gap distribution follows five broad patterns. It is U-shaped (the 
unexplained component is high at the extreme ends of the distribution, suggesting 
sticky floor and glass ceiling effects) in Austria, France, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, and Sweden. The unexplained gap follows an inverse U-shape (no 
evidence of sticky floor or glass ceiling effects) in Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and 
Spain. It follows a decreasing pattern (sticky floor effects only) in Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, and Slovenia. The unexplained portion follows an 
increasing pattern (glass ceiling effects only) in Estonia, Greece, Hungary, and 
Poland. The Czech Republic, Finland, the Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom 
display more complex patterns.  
 
4.3 Estimation of a selection-corrected median wage gap 
 
Building on Johnson et al (2000) and Neal (2004), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) 
note that some countries (e.g. Greece, Italy and Spain) have a surprisingly low gender 
wage gap (particularly when compared to the UK and US). Since these countries tend 
to also have low female employment rates, they speculate that selection affects the 
observed gender wage gap. They impute the wages for the non-participants and the 
unemployed and confirm that the difference between the actual and imputed gaps is 
small for the UK, the US and most central and northern European countries but is 
larger for Greece, Italy and Spain. This suggests that selection by women into the 
labour markets of the latter three countries is not random.
11 The imputation procedure 
                                                 
11 The sample used in their study includes individuals aged 25-54 and excludes the self-employed, 
individuals working in the military and full-time students.   14
for those not in the working sample requires only that a missing wage be placed 
below or above the median. Two approaches are used: The first, imputes the 
unobserved wage based on educated assumptions about the relative position of the 
wage of each individual with respect to the median wage in each country. The second, 
uses probability models to assign individuals to either side of the median wage. We 
follow this approach, describing first the imputation approaches used. 
 
4.3.1 Imputation of wage using educated assumptions 
 
In the first approach and based on the known characteristics of the non-employed, a 
wage is assigned to them. The wage  , ic w , assigned for each individual i in country c 
by gender takes one of the values 
c w  and 
c
w  where 
c w  is the minimum wage in 
country  c and 
c
w  is the maximum wage in country c. At least four alternatives are 
possible in our cross-sectional data: (i) Set  ,
c
ic ww =  if an individual is non-employed, 
(ii) Set  ,
c
ic ww =  if an individual is unemployed, (iii) Set  ,
c
ic ww =  if an individual is 
non-employed and has education less than upper secondary and less than ten year’s 
experience and set  , ic w =
c
w  if education is greater than upper secondary and the 
individual has more than ten years of experience (observations that do not meet these 
conditions are lost), and (iv) Based on assortative matching, set  ,
c
ic ww =  if the non-
employed spouse's wage income belongs to the bottom income quartile of the wage 
distribution; observations where the spouse’s income belonged at the top of the 
distribution were left out. 
 
Column 1, Table 6, reports the median wage gap for the samples used in sections 4.1 
and 4.2, once the number of observations is modified as suggested above. The 
correction based on alternative (i) assigns the minimum value of each gender 
distribution to non-employed individuals, increasing the median wage gap for all 
countries; the gap is not imputed for countries where the female employment rate is 
lower than 50%. The increase is more significant for countries with low female 
employment rates like Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg. The correction 
based on alternative (ii), assigns the minimum value of each gender distribution to   15
unemployed individuals, increasing the median wage gap in countries such as 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Slovenia, and Spain. The change in the median wage gap 
is negligible or negative in Latvia, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Lithuania, Finland, 
Sweden, Estonia and Ireland. The correction based on alternative (iii) assigns the 
minimum value of each gender distribution to low experience and education 
individuals, increasing the median wage gap substantially in countries such as 
Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and Spain. It also increases in Greece. The 
median wage gap decreases or increases only slightly in countries such as Lithuania, 
Estonia, the Slovak Republic, and Latvia. The correction based on alternative (iv) 
assigns the minimum value of each gender distribution only if the non-employed 
spouse's wage income belongs to the bottom income quartile of the wage distribution. 
This is the least stringent assumption and the median wage gap remains unchanged in 
many countries. 
4.3.2 Imputation of wage using the Probit model 
 
The second methodology consists of two steps. In the first step, a Probit model is 
used, for each gender, to determine the probability of an individual receiving a wage 
below the median of the wage distribution. The set of explanatory variables includes 
the variables used in the first-step Probit equation in the Heckman (1974, 1979)-
corrected Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) decompositions. In the second step, the 
predicted probabilities  ˆi p  are used as follows: the employed are included with their 
observed wage and the non-employed with the minimum wage in the gender 
distribution with probability  ˆi p  and the maximum wage in a gender distribution with 
probability ˆ 1 i p − . The median gender wage gap is then estimated for the imputed 
sample for males and females. The gender difference appears in column 6, Table 6.  
 
The median wage gap increases in most countries. It increases considerably in Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain, and The Netherlands, countries with low female employment 
rates. On the other hand, the median wage gap is reduced in Slovenia and Greece. It 
remains almost unchanged in Estonia and the Czech Republic. 
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
   16
Our results based on the first imputation method are consistent with Olivetti and 
Petrongolo (2008) in that the revised wage gaps are higher in Greece, Italy and Spain. 
This is also true for Italy and Spain in the Probit imputation approach. Selection 
issues are clearly important. The selection adjustments in Olivetti and Petrongolo 
(2008) result in generally higher imputed wage gender gaps than is the case in the 
Heckman (1974, 1978) approach. This is likely because of the more conservative 
approach followed in assigning the missing wages. 
5 The role of institutions and work-family reconciliation policies 
 
Labour-market policies are likely to affect the extent of the wage gap both at the mean 
or median and across the whole wage distribution.
12 In this section, the relationship 
between the unexplained part of the wage gap (columns 3 plus 4, Table 2 of the 
Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) approach and column 6, Table 4 of the quantile 
decomposition approach), the sticky floor (column 3, Table 5) and the glass ceiling 
(column 6, Table 5) effects on the one hand and, on the other hand, the institutions 
and gender-specific policies prevailing in the MSs is examined. The trade union 
membership rate is used as a proxy for the wage-setting environment in each MS.
13 
The OECD (2001) Work-family Reconciliation Index is a convenient summary of the 
policies prevailing in MSs on work-family issues. The original measure used five 
variables which are not all available for our 24 MSs and so we have constructed a 
close substitute based on information which is, in fact, available. The new summary 
measure relies on (i) the availability of formal child care for children under 3 for more 
than 30 hours a week, (ii) maternity pay entitlement (product of length and 
generosity), (iii) the extent to which part-time employment for family, children and 
other reasons is possible, (iv) the extent to which working times can be adjusted for 
family reasons and (v) the extent to which whole days of leave can be obtained 
                                                 
12 Family policies may have a positive or negative effect on the wage gap. Extended parental leave may 
increase out-of-work time and, as a result, employees returning to employment may receive reduced 
wage growth, resulting in a higher wage gap. On the other hand, parental leave may help preserve the 
ties of employees with their firms, increasing firms’ incentive to invest in human capital, implying a 
lower wage gap. Such effects may hold with different force at different points of the wage distribution. 
Child-care policies may have an overall positive effect because they increase attachment to work and 
the incentive to acquire human capital and because they ease the economic burden of child-care. 
13 Countries with higher unionization rates tend to have lower wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn (1992) 
and Blau and Kahn (1996)), possibly lowering the wage gap. Trade unions may be less likely to 
represent the interests of their female electorate because they may be perceived as having less 
attachment to the labour market - Booth and Francesconi (2003). They may also be less sensitive to the 
interests of members at the low end of the wage distribution - see also Arulampalam et al (2006).    17
without loss of holiday entitlement for family reasons. The data actually used to 
produce our composite index (similar to the OECD data
14), the index itself and the 
trade union membership rate date appear in Table 7.  
 
Figure 3 presents the relationship between (i) the mean gender wage gap, (ii) the 
median gender wage gap, (iii) the glass-ceiling effect, and (iv) the sticky floor effect 
and our family reconciliation index. The first two graphs within Figure 3 show that, 
across the 24 countries, the unexplained parts of the mean and median wage gap are 
negatively related to the work-family reconciliation index. That is, countries with 
generous work-families policies (e.g. Denmark and The Netherlands) tend to have a 
lower unexplained wage gap compared to countries with less generous policies (e.g. 
Cyprus, Poland and the Slovak Republic). The index is positively and significantly (at 
the 10% level) related to glass ceiling effects and it is positively and significantly 
related to sticky floor effects at the 1% level. That is, in countries with more generous 
family-work policies, the gender pay gap tends to be higher at the extremes of the 
wage distribution. At the low end of the distribution (graph 4, Figure 3), this may be 
caused by an increase in the participation of low-paid female employees who may be 
responding to better child-care arrangements. At the high end of the wage distribution 
(graph 3, Figure 3) this may be due to professional women increasing out-of-work 
time (given more generous maternity leave provisions) and paying a cost for doing so.  
 
Table 8 presents the results of the regression of the unexplained part from the Oaxaca 
and Ransom (1994) decomposition on the constituent indices as well as the composite 
family-work reconciliation index. Given that Figure 3 suggests that the Oaxaca and 
Ransom (1994) average and the Melly (2005) median gender gap behave similarly 
relative to the family reconciliation index, we present results for the former. The 
relationship between the unexplained gap and the composite index (this is what 
appeared in graph 1, Figure 3) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
(column 6, Table 8). The relationship for the constituent indices is individually 
negative and significant at least at the 5% level except for the maternity leave variable 
which is positive and significant at the 5% level. When all indices are entered in the 
regression equation, only the maternity leave variable maintains its significance. 
                                                 
14 The correlation coefficient between the fourteen EU countries included in the OECD (2001) and in 
our composite index is 59% and it is significant at the 5% level.   18
Thus, it would appear that very generous and extended maternity leaves may have an 
unintended impact on the mean gender gap, just as the composite index appears to do 
at the extremes of the wage distribution. Ruhm (1998) using a sample of nine 
European countries
15 indicated that although parental leave is associated with 
increases in female employment rates, if it is taken over extended periods it may 
reduce the relative wage of female employees. This negative effect can be attributed 
to different reasons. Female labour supply increases in the period prior to childbirth in 
order to be eligible for parental leave. This is likely to reduce female earnings. Also, 
women having multiple births over a short period of time may be away from their job 
for several years causing substantial depreciation of human capital. Beblo and Wolf 
(2002) find evidence that discontinuous employment caused by maternal leave 
reduces the wage for females. Gutierrez-Domenech (2005) indicate that an extended 
period of maternity leave is counterproductive since it postpones return to work, 
reduces skills and might cause a further disincentive to re-entry.  
 
Figure 4 presents the relationship between the two unexplained wage gaps, the glass 
ceiling and sticky floor effects on the one hand and the union membership rate on the 
other. The relationship of the unexplained part of the mean and median wage gap, in 
Graphs 1 and 2, Figure 4, is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.
16 
Thus, unionism appears to be associated with reductions in the wage gap at the centre 
of the wage distribution. Graphs 3 and 4, Figure 4, reveal a positive relation between 
the gender gap at the top and bottom of the wage distribution and the union 
membership rate but this is not significant at the top and significant at the 5% level at 
the bottom of the distribution. This latter effect may arise if unions pay less attention 




Using data from the 2007 EU-SILC, the gender wage gap is examined for a set of 24 
EU member countries. The gender wage gap varies considerably between countries, 
ranging from 0.502 ln wage points in Cyprus to 0.087 ln wage points in Slovenia. 
 
                                                 
15 Ruhm’s (1998) dataset includes Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway 
and Sweden. 
16 Union coverage data is not available for Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia.   19
The empirical results show that a large part of the wage gap is not explained by 
characteristics and, indeed, in several countries the unexplained gap is larger than the 
total, suggesting that female characteristics are superior to the male ones. When the 
decomposition is performed across the wage distribution using quantile regression, 
the unexplained gender wage gap widens at the top of the distribution (glass ceiling 
effect) in most countries and, in some cases, it also widens at the bottom of the 
distribution (sticky floor effect). The wage gap is wider when non-random selection 
into work is taken into account; this suggests that women in the selected samples are 
more highly qualified than in the population at large. 
 
The unexplained gender wage may not be due to female disadvantage because data 
limitations may preclude study of important forces. Such forces may include country-
specific institutions and policies which would not show up in individual (or even in a 
small group of) country studies. To explore these it is necessary to study a large 
number of countries where the variability is due to policies and not other forces, such 
as the proclivity to discrimination. Focusing on EU member states is useful in that 
they all, at least nominally, espouse non-discriminatory attitudes and practices. We 
find that the trade union membership rate is negatively related to the average and 
median unexplained wage gaps. Generous policies concerning the reconciliation of 
work and family life also reduce the mean and median unexplained wage gaps. These 
effects are rather different at the tails of the unexplained gender wage gaps. There is 
some evidence that countries with more generous work-family reconciliation policies 
tend to have stronger glass ceiling and sticky floor effects and regression analysis 
suggests that, at the mean, this may be due to maternity policies. It is conceivable that, 
if these are long and generous, they may encourage absences from the labour market 
which, in the end, have unintended effects as returning female workers are only able 
to command lower wages. Such effects, if confirmed by further study, would suggest 
that care should be taken in the design of work-family reconciliation policies.   20
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Work / Family Reconciliation Index
Note:
(i) Coefficient = -0.008 , p-value = 0.004
(ii) Dependent variable is the unexplained part from the Oaxaca-Ransom 
     decomposition, the sum of columns 3&4 of Table 2
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Work / Family Reconciliation Index
Note:
(i) Coefficient = -0.018, p-value = 0.000
(ii) Dependent variable is the unexplained part from the quantile 
     decomposition, column 6 of Table 4
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Note:
(i) Coefficient = 0.008, p-value = 0.075
(ii) Dependent variable is the difference between the unexplained part  
    of the 90th and 50th percentile decomposition (difference between  
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Work / Family Reconciliation Index
Note:
(i) Coefficient = 0.017, p-value = 0.009
(ii) Dependent variable is the difference between the unexplained part of 
     the 10th and 50th percentile decomposition (difference between 
(4) Sticky Floor (10th-50th Quantile Difference)
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Note:
(i) Coefficient = -0.008 , p-value = 0.039
(ii) Dependent variable is the unexplained part from the Oaxaca-
      Ransom decomposition, the sum of columns 3&4 of Table 2
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Note:
(i) Coefficient = -0.018, p-value = 0.030
(ii) Dependent variable is the unexplained part from the Quantile
     decomposition, column 6 of Table 4
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Note:
(i) Coefficient = 0.008, p-value = 0.306
(ii) Dependent variable is the difference between the unexplained  
     part of the 90th and 50th percentile decomposition (difference 
     between columns 10 and 6 of Table 4)
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(i) Coefficient = 0.017, p-value = 0.030
(ii) Dependent variable is the difference between the unexplained 
      part of the 10th and 50th percentile decomposition (difference 
      between columns 2 and 6 of Table 4)
(4) Sticky Floor (10th-50th Quantile Difference)




Table 1: Ln-earnings and employment rate by country 
  Ln-earnings  Employment Rate (%) 
  Male Female  Difference Rank Male  Female Difference  Rank 
Austria  10.381 10.156  0.225  10  92  55  37  8 
Belgium  10.474 10.347  0.127  21  88  54  34  9 
Cyprus  10.067  9.564  0.502  1  94 64 30 10 
Czech Republic  9.056  8.732  0.323  3  94 72 21 13 
Denmark  10.854  10.657  0.198  13 95 76 20 16 
Estonia  8.918  8.495  0.423  2  90 80 10 20 
Finland  10.514  10.269  0.245  8  80 61 19 17 
France  10.233  10.031  0.202  11 91 70 21 14 
Germany  10.507 10.311  0.196  14  89  50  39  6 
Greece  9.900 9.714  0.186  15  88  41  46  2 
Hungary  8.677  8.576  0.100  23 85 68 17 18 
Ireland  10.698 10.462  0.236  9  84  46  38  7 
Italy  10.156 9.991  0.164  19  84  42  42  3 
Latvia  8.616  8.311  0.305  4  85 75 10 21 
Lithuania  8.687 8.400  0.286  5  86  80  6  24 
Luxembourg  10.672 10.496  0.176  18  92  51  41  4 
Netherlands, The  10.613 10.434  0.178  17  94  30  64  1 
Poland  8.801  8.619  0.181  16 81 56 25 12 
Portugal  9.401  9.279  0.122  22 87 67 20 15 
Slovak Republic  8.646 8.378  0.268  6  91  82  8  23 
Slovenia  9.598 9.512  0.087  24  88  79  9  22 
Spain  9.897 9.744  0.153  20  88  48  40  5 
Sweden  10.352  10.155  0.198  12 91 77 14 19 
United Kingdom  10.672  10.419  0.253  7  93 67 26 11 
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Table 2: Decompositions using age as a proxy for experience 
 Oaxaca-Ransom  decomposition    Heckman-corrected Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition 
 
Total 
Explained Unexplained   
Total 
Explained Unexplained 
  Endowments  Male 
Advantage 
Female 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Austria 0.225***  0.060***  0.051***  0.114***    0.334***  0.024*  0.072**  0.239*** 
Belgium 0.127***  0.038***  0.029***  0.060***    0.135***  0.025**  0.027***  0.082*** 
Cyprus  0.502*** 0.225***  0.124***  0.153***    0.478*** 0.186***  -0.037  0.328*** 
Czech Republic  0.323*** 0.088***  0.107***  0.128***   0.277***  0.062*** 0.027*** 0.189*** 
Denmark 0.198***  0.065**  0.055***  0.077***    0.182***  0.037  0.026*  0.119*** 
Estonia  0.423*** 0.200***  0.109***  0.114***    0.602*** 0.181***  0.171***  0.250*** 
Finland  0.245*** 0.116***  0.060***  0.069***    0.216*** 0.093***  0.029**  0.094*** 
France  0.202*** 0.079***  0.047***  0.076***    0.238*** 0.061***  0.030**  0.147*** 
Germany  0.196*** 0.060***  0.043***  0.094***    0.336*** 0.037***  0.122***  0.176*** 
Greece 0.186***  0.003  0.070*** 0.113***    0.204*** -0.037**  0.016 0.225*** 
Hungary 0.100***  -0.031***  0.063***  0.069***    0.042  -0.036***  -0.044  0.122*** 
Ireland 0.236***  0.053***  0.066***  0.117***    0.281***  0.038**  0.042*  0.201*** 
Italy 0.164***  -0.007  0.058***  0.112***    0.150***  -0.031***  0.041***  0.141*** 
Latvia  0.305*** 0.099***  0.106***  0.100***    0.392*** 0.091***  0.114*  0.186*** 
Lithuania  0.286*** 0.081***  0.102***  0.103***    0.204*** 0.076***  -0.076*  0.204*** 
Luxembourg 0.176***  0.049**  0.039***  0.088***    0.141***  0.019  0.042***  0.080*** 
Netherlands,  The  0.178*** 0.068***  0.024***  0.086***    0.159*** 0.043***  0.030***  0.086*** 
Poland 0.181***  0.004  0.079***  0.098***    0.390***  -0.024***  0.155***  0.259*** 
Portugal 0.122***  -0.069***  0.089***  0.101***    0.125**  -0.111***  0.015  0.220*** 
Slovak  Republic  0.268*** 0.072***  0.098***  0.098***    0.223*** 0.064***  -0.066***  0.224*** 
Slovenia 0.087***  -0.063***  0.074***  0.076***    0.059**  -0.106***  0.015*  0.151*** 
Spain 0.153***  0.001  0.057***  0.095***    0.238***  -0.026***  0.095***  0.168*** 
Sweden  0.198*** 0.086***  0.046***  0.066***    0.178*** 0.051***  0.033**  0.094*** 
United  Kingdom 0.253***  0.081*** 0.068***  0.104***   0.236***  0.066***  0.026***  0.144*** 
                 
European  Union  0.381*** 0.194***  0.077***  0.110***    0.461*** 0.168***  0.053***  0.240*** 
Note: Columns 1-4 report the results of the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition and columns 7-8 the Heckman-corrected Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition. The 
explained part (the first term of equation (1)) measures the part of the predicted average wage difference that can be explained by the difference between the male 
and female characteristics. The unexplained part (the second and third terms of equation (1)) corresponds to the male advantage and female disadvantage. Three 
stars indicate significance at the 1%, two stars at the 5% and one star at the 10% level.   29 
 
Table 3: Decompositions using experience for the countries where this is available 
 Oaxaca-Ransom  decomposition    Heckman-corrected Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition 
 
Total 
Explained Unexplained   
Total 
Explained Unexplained 
  Endowments  Male 
Advantage 
Female 




 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Austria 0.226***  0.070***  0.048***  0.108***    0.333***  0.033**  0.069**  0.231*** 
Belgium 0.126***  0.037***  0.029***  0.060***    0.136***  0.026**  0.023***  0.087*** 
Cyprus  0.502*** 0.246***  0.115***  0.142***    0.498*** 0.211***  -0.018  0.305*** 
Czech Republic  0.323*** 0.094***  0.104***  0.125***   0.277***  0.065*** 0.028*** 0.184*** 
Denmark  - -  -  -    - -  -  - 
Estonia  0.424*** 0.201***  0.109***  0.114***    0.588*** 0.179***  0.164***  0.246*** 
Finland  - -  -  -    - -  -  - 
France  0.202*** 0.084***  0.045***  0.073***    0.240*** 0.067***  0.031**  0.142*** 
Germany  0.198*** 0.062***  0.042***  0.093***    0.338*** 0.040***  0.122***  0.176*** 
Greece  - -  -  -    - -  -  - 
Hungary  - -  -  -    - -  -  - 
Ireland 0.234***  0.060***  0.063***  0.110***    0.271***  0.045**  0.040*  0.186*** 
Italy 0.164***  0.001  0.056***  0.108***    0.149***  -0.024***  0.036***  0.136*** 
Latvia  0.308*** 0.103***  0.106***  0.099***    0.390*** 0.095***  0.115*  0.180*** 
Lithuania  0.286*** 0.080***  0.102***  0.104***    0.203*** 0.075***  -0.075*  0.203*** 
Luxembourg 0.177***  0.066***  0.034*** 0.077***   0.149***  0.038*  0.038*** 0.074*** 
Netherlands,  The  0.180*** 0.070***  0.024***  0.085***    0.167*** 0.047***  0.027***  0.093*** 
Poland 0.184***  0.011  0.077***  0.095***    0.404***  -0.017**  0.167***  0.253*** 
Portugal 0.121***  -0.061***  0.085***  0.097***    0.117*  -0.104***  0.009  0.212*** 
Slovak  Republic  0.268*** 0.073***  0.097***  0.098***    0.228*** 0.065***  -0.059***  0.222*** 
Slovenia  0.076*** -0.068***  0.075***  0.070***    0.172*** -0.113***  -0.012  0.298*** 
Spain 0.153***  0.017*  0.051***  0.085***    0.250***  -0.011  0.089***  0.171*** 
Sweden  - -  -  -    - -  -  - 
United  Kingdom -  -  -  -   -  -  -  - 
Note: Columns 1-4 report the results of the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition and columns 7-8 the Heckman-corrected Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition. The 
explained part (the first term of equation (1)) measures the part of the predicted average wage difference that can be explained by the difference between the male 
and female characteristics. The unexplained part (the second and third terms of equation (1)) corresponds to the male advantage and female disadvantage. Three 
stars indicate significance at the 1%, two stars at the 5%, and one star at the 10%  level.   30 
Table 4: Quantile regression decompositions 
 Quantile  decompositions   
Oaxaca-Ransom decompositions   10%  25%  50%  75%  90%   
Austria  0.240 [0.267] 0.205 [0.229] 0.200 [0.222] 0.212 [0.230] 0.269 [0.265]   0.225  [0.165] 
Belgium  0.131 [0.189] 0.114 [0.168] 0.101 [0.130] 0.114 [0.101] 0.167 [0.109]   0.127  [0.089] 
Cyprus  1.012 [0.512] 0.539 [0.491] 0.423 [0.439] 0.309 [0.353] 0.279 [0.299]   0.502  [0.277] 
Czech  Republic  0.337 [0.347] 0.346 [0.370] 0.299 [0.357] 0.287 [0.300] 0.341 [0.302]   0.323  [0.235] 
Denmark  0.153 [0.329] 0.133 [0.204] 0.147 [0.158] 0.215 [0.197] 0.322 [0.260]   0.198  [0.132] 
Estonia  0.349 [0.264] 0.402 [0.327] 0.442 [0.387] 0.454 [0.425] 0.479 [0.430]   0.423  [0.223] 
Finland  0.128 [0.192] 0.181 [0.199] 0.253 [0.225] 0.316 [0.214] 0.325 [0.192]   0.245  [0.129] 
France  0.152 [0.169] 0.137 [0.165] 0.159 [0.167] 0.217 [0.174] 0.275 [0.198]   0.202  [0.123] 
Germany  0.224 [0.334] 0.156 [0.303] 0.154 [0.212] 0.190 [0.181] 0.240 [0.185]   0.196  [0.137] 
Greece  0.159 [0.240] 0.178 [0.270] 0.194 [0.318] 0.184 [0.335] 0.193 [0.318]   0.186  [0.183] 
Hungary  0.027 [0.101] 0.086 [0.179] 0.108 [0.217] 0.105 [0.208] 0.157 [0.213]   0.100  [0.132] 
Ireland  0.197 [0.234] 0.193 [0.218] 0.208 [0.194] 0.248 [0.218] 0.288 [0.280]   0.236  [0.183] 
Italy  0.165 [0.225] 0.136 [0.198] 0.132 [0.199] 0.167 [0.215] 0.225 [0.242]   0.164  [0.170] 
Latvia  0.224 [0.255] 0.339 [0.372] 0.353 [0.391] 0.295 [0.325] 0.305 [0.303]   0.305  [0.206] 
Lithuania  0.221 [0.168] 0.309 [0.262] 0.343 [0.380] 0.282 [0.358] 0.248 [0.310]   0.286  [0.205] 
Luxembourg  0.213 [0.366] 0.177 [0.320] 0.123 [0.236] 0.156 [0.148] 0.188 [0.134]   0.176  [0.127] 
Netherlands,  The 0.160 [0.211] 0.127 [0.191] 0.141 [0.164] 0.193 [0.160] 0.238 [0.181]   0.178  [0.110] 
Poland  0.131 [0.193] 0.177 [0.273] 0.191 [0.311] 0.191 [0.326] 0.218 [0.344]   0.181  [0.177] 
Portugal  0.136 [0.167] 0.173 [0.254] 0.190 [0.355] 0.072 [0.387] -0.005 [0.275]   0.122  [0.190] 
Slovak  Republic 0.281 [0.343] 0.250 [0.330] 0.252 [0.329] 0.263 [0.338] 0.301 [0.331]   0.268  [0.196] 
Slovenia  0.150 [0.264] 0.121 [0.223] 0.062 [0.224] -0.005 [0.179] 0.045 [0.147]   0.087  [0.150] 
Spain  0.197 [0.238] 0.170 [0.250] 0.149 [0.260] 0.127 [0.233] 0.106 [0.185]   0.153  [0.152] 
Sweden  0.223 [0.263] 0.163 [0.157] 0.160 [0.119] 0.212 [0.144] 0.252 [0.168]   0.198  [0.112] 
United  Kingdom 0.201 [0.255] 0.220 [0.289] 0.235 [0.263] 0.246 [0.226] 0.325 [0.270]   0.253  [0.172] 
Note: The decomposition methodology is described in section 4.2. The decompositions are estimated at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantile. For 
each of the reported quantiles, the difference between the actual ln earnings for the two genders is reported first, followed by the portion which is not 
explained by the quantile regressions in square brackets. The last two columns provide the (no selection) total and unexplained wage gaps from Table 2. 
The male advantage and female disadvantage are summed up to produce the unexplained part of the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition.   31
 
Table 5: Summary of quantile evidence on sticky floors and glass ceilings 
  Sticky floor measured by





















 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Austria   Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Belgium    Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Cyprus Yes  Yes  Yes         Decreasing 
Czech 
Republic   Yes      Yes  Yes  Complex 
Denmark        Yes  Yes  Yes  Increasing 
Estonia         Yes  Yes  Yes  Increasing 
Finland             Yes  Increasing 
France        Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Germany   Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Greece             Flat 
Hungary         Yes  Yes  Yes  S-shaped 
Ireland        Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Italy   Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Latvia              Reverse  U 
Lithuania             Reverse-U 
Luxembourg Yes  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Netherlands, 
The   Yes      Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
Poland        Yes  Yes  Yes  Increasing 
Portugal               Reverse  U 
Slovak 
Republic   Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Comples 
Slovenia Yes  Yes Yes      Yes    U-Shaped 
Spain Yes  Yes  Yes          Decreasing 
Sweden   Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  U-Shaped 
United 
Kingdom        Yes  Yes  Yes  Increasing 
Notes: 
a A ‘glass ceiling’ effect is defined to exist if the 90
th percentile age gap exceeds the 
reference gap by at least two percentage points. 
b A ‘sticky floor’ effect is defined to exist if 
the 10
th percentile wage gap exceeds the reference gap by at least to percentage points. 
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Table 6: Gender wage gap based on the Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) selection procedures 
Median wage 
gap    Imputation based on four alternative assumptions    Probability-based 
imputation 
     (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)     
Austria  0.199    0.496 0.224 0.331 0.245    0.356 
Belgium  0.111    0.314 0.169 0.199 0.125    0.195 
Cyprus  0.419    0.698 0.436 0.539 0.427    0.538 
Czech Republic  0.310    0.426  0.325 0.367 0.308    0.319 
Denmark 0.138    0.168  0.145  -  0.139    0.164 
Estonia  0.439    0.507 0.397 0.439 0.439    0.443 
Finland 0.254    0.311  0.243  -  0.257    0.301 
France  0.152    0.236 0.173 0.203 0.164    0.209 
Germany  0.139    0.445 0.212 0.158 0.156    0.232 
Greece  0.231    - 0.320 - 0.247    0.035 
Hungary 0.116    0.288  0.130  -  0.143    0.199 
Ireland  0.224    -  0.179 0.340 0.245    0.553 
Italy  0.137    -  0.182 0.410 0.177    0.186 
Latvia  0.366    0.436 0.375 0.395 0.378    0.398 
Lithuania  0.346    0.444 0.344 0.338 0.348    0.366 
Luxembourg 0.127    0.781 0.130 0.386 0.189    0.332 
Netherlands,  The  0.134      0.149 0.228 0.156    0.440 
Poland  0.214    0.417 0.292 0.321 0.223    0.318 
Portugal  0.187    0.345 0.205 0.267 0.200    0.230 
Slovak  Republic  0.283    0.307 0.321 0.297 0.285    0.297 
Slovenia  0.069    0.120 0.112 0.077 0.073    0.062 
Spain  0.145    -  0.215 0.392 0.187    0.299 
Sweden 0.164    0.173  0.155  -  0.164    0.172 
United Kingdom  0.244    0.461  0.245  -  0.270    0.368 
Note: The first column provides the difference between the median ln wage for males and females. In column: (i) min wage assigned if non-employed, (ii) min wage assigned if unemployed, 
(iii) min wage assigned if education less than upper secondary and less than a ten years of experience and max wage assigned if education greater than upper secondary and more than ten years 
experience, (iv) min wage assigned if non-employed and spouse's wage income belongs to the bottom income quartile of wage distribution. In the sixth column, the imputation is based on the 
Probit model. In the column headed (i), the imputation is not estimated for some countries because we assume ex ante positive self selection and, in these countries, more than 50% of the 
female population is not working. In the column headed (iii), experience is not reported for six countries and the imputation cannot be performed.   33

































Austria  -1.01 0.02 1.50 0.88 1.55 2.94 31.7 
Belgium  0.46 -1.63 1.22 0.76 1.06 1.86 52.9 
Cyprus  -0.08 -0.81 -0.71 -1.16 -1.85 -4.62  - 
Czech Republic  -1.01 1.26 -0.71  -0.38 0.01 -0.84 21.0 
Denmark  3.62 0.84 0.00 1.36 1.71 7.53 69.1 
Estonia  -0.32 1.67 -0.50  -0.62  -0.07 0.16 36.1 
Finland  0.46 0.02 -0.70  1.06 0.09 0.92 70.3 
France  0.23 -1.63 0.18 -0.50  -0.96  -2.69  7.8 
Germany  -0.39 -0.81 1.22 -0.98 -0.48 -1.44 19.9 
Greece  -0.70 0.02 -0.83  -0.68  -0.39  -2.59 23.0 
Hungary  -0.62 0.43 -0.83  -0.68  -0.56  -2.27 16.9 
Ireland
§  -0.55 2.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 31.7 
Italy  0.23 0.43 0.04  -0.68  -0.72  -0.71 33.3 
Latvia  0.23 0.02 -0.82  -0.32  0.01  -0.89  - 
Lithuania  -0.32 0.84 -0.63  -1.34  -0.96  -2.40  - 
Luxembourg  -0.39 0.02 1.12 1.36 -0.31 1.79 41.8 
Netherlands, The  -0.70 0.02 2.78 2.61 1.88 6.59 19.8 
Poland  -0.86 0.02 -0.81  -1.28  -1.21  -4.14 14.4 
Portugal  1.00 0.43 -0.85  -0.32  -0.80  -0.54 18.7 
Slovak Republic  -0.78 -0.39 -0.83 -0.92 -1.12 -4.05  23.6 
Slovenia
§  0.69 0.00 -0.84  0.16 0.82 0.83  - 
Spain  0.07 0.43 -0.51  0.52 0.90 1.41 14.6 
Sweden  1.38 -1.63 0.32 0.64 1.23 1.93 70.8 
United Kingdom  -0.62 -1.63 1.19  0.58  0.17 -0.31 28.0 
Sources: 
§Data for the first five columns are drawn from Eurostat (2009). 
‡Data for union membership rates are 
taken from OECD (2009) for all countries but Estonia for which data are taken from ILO (1997). 
Notes: 
§All indicators in the first five columns are scaled in order to have a zero mean and standard deviation equal 
to unity. So, a value of zero implies that the country concerned is at the average value for the countries in the table. 
†The composite index is the sum of the first five columns in the table. 
§ Maternity pay entitlement is missing for 
Slovenia and Voluntary part-time working, Adjust working day for family reasons and Take leave for family 
reasons are missing for Ireland. Missing values are replaced with the mean value of the rest of the sample. 
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Table 8: Relationship between the Oaxaca-Ransom unexplained gender gap part and 
the work-family reconciliation index and its constituent indices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Child  Care  -0.014**        -0.007 
  (0.006)        (0.007) 
Maternity     0.018**        0.013** 
   (0.008)        (0.006) 
Vol.  part-time     -0.024***       -0.008 
     (0.007)      (0.009) 
Adjust work day        -0.027***      -0.012 
      (0.007)     (0.012) 
Family days off           -0.025***    -0.008 
       (0.008)    (0.015) 
Composite  index        -0.008***   
        (0.002)   
Constant 0.166***  0.166***  0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
         
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R
2  Adjusted  0.053 0.119 0.259 0.348 0.284 0.258 0.401 
Note: OLS regression equations; robust standard errors in parentheses. Three stars indicate significance 
at the 1%, two stars at the 5% and one star at the 10% level. 
 
 
 